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Unless exempted or waived, the "Transfer Rule"1 provides that
student-athletes transferring between "collegiate institutions [are]
required to complete one full academic year of residence at the

1.
For purposes of this note, the term "Transfer Rule" refers generally to the rules
and bylaws contained in the 2006-2007 NCAA Division I Manual, Article 14, Section 5,
"Transfer Regulations."
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certifying institution before being eligible to compete. '2 Originally
designed to be a "discussion group and rules-making body"3 to address
very specific issues related to player safety, the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) has evolved into a governing body that
"regulate[s] nearly every aspect of college sports." 4 The NCAA
constitution establishes amateurism and the promotion of education
as two of its guiding principles. 5 Courts, recognizing the value of these
principles, have generally deferred to the NCAA.
Despite the NCAA's official promotion of these objectives, it has
been widely suggested that the NCAA falls short of adequately
advancing these principles.6 An organization designed to further such
goals has value to member institutions and the students who compete
as athletes within the system. If the Transfer Rule no longer fosters
the values that the NCAA was designed to create, courts should be
less deferential to the NCAA. Any deference should erode even if the
interests of the student-athletes are not aligned with those of the
NCAA. The Supreme Court has held that the NCAA is not a state
actor, but in the eyes of the public and the courts, the NCAA still
serves a "public function." 7 Courts should examine the extent to which
the current implementation of the Transfer Rule furthers the goals it
was designed to promote.
First, it is relevant to consider why courts have been
deferential. Originally, the NCAA was a private organization that

2.
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 2006-2007, NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS § 14.5.1,
[hereinafter NCAA BYLAW] ("A student who transfers... to a member institution from any
collegiate institution is required to complete one full academic year of residence at the
certifying institution before being eligible to compete for or to receive travel expenses from
the member institution, unless the student satisfies the applicable transfer requirements
or receives an exception or waiver ...").
3.
NCAA.org, History, http://www.ncaa.org/about/history.html (last visited Jan. 3,
2007) (offering a brief synopsis of the evolution of the NCAA).
4.
Sarah M. Konsky, Note, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2003).
5.
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 2006-2007, NCAA CONST. §1.3 [hereinafter NCAA
CONST.] ("A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics
and professional sports.").
6.
Id.; see generally Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association's Role in Regulating IntercollegiateAthletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
9 (2000).
7.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198-99 (1988);
Hawkins v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 652 F. Supp. 602, 608 (C.D. Ill. 1987)
("Although the NCAA may perform a public function in overseeing the nation's
intercollegiate athletics, it remains a private institution." (citing McHale v. Cornell Univ.,
60 F. Supp. 67, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 1985)).
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"perform[ed] a public function in overseeing the nation's
intercollegiate athletics. ' 8
Challenges to NCAA rules have been
waged on antitrust grounds. The courts have acted by either carving
out an exception for the NCAA because of its public function or by
holding that the actions are "essentially noncommercial in nature." 9
Today, there is a strong argument that the NCAA functions as a
cartel, acting to further the goals of its member institutions largely by
controlling both the means and the ends of production.' 0 The interests
of the member institutions and those of the student-athletes within
the system are not entirely aligned.
Second, it is necessary to examine the details of the Transfer
Rule and how it is enforced.'1 Every transfer is subject to a residency
requirement. 12 The exceptions and waivers are largely for narrow
circumstances, and are unlikely to apply to the majority of studentathletes seeking transfers. 13 Thus, students wishing to avoid the
stricture of the residency requirement are left with a series of narrow
exemptions and waivers. The Transfer Rule provides no guaranteed
exemption for student-athletes seeking a transfer solely for academic
purposes. If a student-athlete's situation does not fall under one of the
specific exemptions of Section 14.514 or under the "Additional Waivers"
of Section 14.8.1.2, "there shall be no waiver by the Association of any
of the provisions of this bylaw."'15 Such a system places discretionary
power in the NCAA and leaves those seeking waiver little authority
upon which to stake their claim.
This note will explore the traditional rationales offered by the
NCAA in implementing the Transfer Rule and suggests that these
rationales are not served by the current Rule. Part I frames the
environment in which the Transfer Rule exists by tracing the history
of the NCAA. Part II explores the traditional rationales offered for
justifying the Transfer Rule. In McHale v. Cornell University, the
NCAA suggested that the purposes of the Transfer Rule are "(1) to
prevent transfers solely for athletic reasons, (2) to avoid exploitation of
student-athletes, and (3) to allow transfer students time to adjust to

8.
9.
10.

McHale, 620 F. Supp. at 69.
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001).
See ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC

ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR, 20-34 (1992).

11.

See NCAA BYLAW§ 14.5.1.

12.

Id.

13.

Konsky, supra note 4, at 1586.
NCAA BYLAw § 14.5.

14.

15.
Id. § 14.8. The additional waivers for the residency requirement, which are
permissive rather than mandatory, are described under bylaw 14.8.1.2. Id. § 14.8.1.2.
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their new environment."'16 While some regulation of the transfer of
student-athletes between member institutions likely furthers these
legitimate goals, this note will argue that there are other forces
driving the Transfer Rule that are not aligned with such purposes.
Finally, Part III offers some suggestions for how courts and the NCAA
can align the Transfer Rule with its purported rationales.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE NCAA AND ITS TRANSFER RULE

The NCAA describes itself as a "voluntary organization
through which the nation's colleges and universities govern their
athletics programs."'17 In reality, the NCAA is much more powerful
than this mission statement implies. Member institutions are required
to comply with the rules of the NCAA. Failure to become a member of
the institution at the very least would likely "thwart" any hopes of
8
being competitive in intercollegiate athletics.'
A. Formationof the NCAA
In 1905, there was concern surrounding the increase in serious
injuries and deaths occurring in intercollegiate football. 19 Pleas for
reform from President Theodore Roosevelt and the public resulted in
the creation of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United
States (IAAUS), which later became the NCAA. 20 The NCAA
gradually expanded the scope of its power from its initial role-curbing
football injuries and "loosely organizing sports" 2 ' such that today, the
NCAA dominates virtually every aspect of intercollegiate athletics.
While the NCAA began as an institution designed to apply
rules and procedures of play on the field, it now exerts control over all
of the externalities associated with a functioning intercollegiate
athletic system. Beginning largely as a "discussion group and rulesmaking body," one of the most prominent shifts occurred in 1921 when
the NCAA held its first sanctioned national championship. 22 Since
then, the NCAA has been synonymous with college athletics.
16.
McHale, 60 F. Supp. at 68 n.4.
17.
NCAA.org, About the NCAA, http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/about-ncaa/ (last
visited Jan. 3, 2007).
18.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 n.19 (1988).
19.
See NCAA.org, History, supra note 3.
20.
Id. ("The IAAUS officially was constituted March 31, 1906, and took its present
name (NCAA) in 1910.").
21.
Konsky, supra note 4 (providing a general background of the NCAA and its
purpose).
22.
See NCAA.org, History, supra note 3.
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B. OrganizationalStructure of the NCAA
In many ways, the organization of the NCAA resembles a
corporate structure. 23 The general guidelines for its structure are
detailed in Article 4 of the NCAA constitution. 24 The Executive
Committee delegates responsibility, while the member institutions
within each division are responsible for voting on issues as they
arise. 25 To accomplish the governance of several different divisions,
the NCAA Board of Directors, representative of the member
institutions and their respective divisions, establishes policy and a
"strategic plan." 26 There are also committees and subcommittees that
deal with daily business, including the investigation of "potential rule
27
violations" and the levying of penalties.
The NCAA governing bodies are organized to be representative
of their members, as reflected in the rulemaking procedures and
profit-sharing plans. 28 As the NCAA began to influence all aspects of
intercollegiate athletics, however, it developed a brand all its own, one
independent of the organizational needs of the members. 29 Pivotal
decisions, such as National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Tarkanian, demonstrate how the NCAA as an organization is not only
independent of its membership, but also can act as a powerful force in
driving policy at the member institution level. 30 As the NCAA has
evolved, so have opinions on how to properly classify its organizational
structure and its impact on the market for college athletics.

23.

Konsky, supra note 4, at 1582.

24.

NCAA CONST. § 4.01.

25.
Id. § 4.01.1.
26.
Id. §§ 4.1, 4.2.2.
27.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1582.
28.
See NCAA CONST. § 4.5.2 (noting "rulemaking" among the responsibilities of
the NCAA Management Council); NCAA CONST. § 4.01.2.2 ("All members shall receive
revenue from all gross revenue sources received by the Association, unless specifically
excluded, through the division's revenue distribution formulas."). The NCAA is managed by
representatives of its member institutions and these institutions are the beneficiaries of
any revenues generated by the Association. A voluntary organization, intuitively colleges
and institutions will only join the NCAA if it is in their own interest to do so. Studentathletes are not members of the NCAA.
29.
NCAA.org, The NCAA Brand, http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/aboutncaa/
ncaabrand] (last visited Jan. 3, 2006) ("Learning. Balance. Spirit. Community. Fair play.
Character. These are the attributes that the NCAA promotes through its branding
initiative. An important part of the NCAA brand is a consistent image that supports these
attributes.").
30.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1988).
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1. NCAA as a Cartel
The rights, privileges, and obligations of a business entity are
largely determined by the form it takes. The transformation of the
NCAA from a limited purpose organization to a truly global force has
resulted in confusion over how to classify its business structure.
Although the NCAA is technically a "nonprofit" organization, even a
cursory evaluation of its operations reveals that in many ways it
31
resembles a cartel.
The business goal of the NCAA is to maximize joint profits
among its members. 32 Cartels act by regulating virtually every aspect
of the competitive process. This includes regulation, minimization of
the cost of "input" (student-athletes), and control over the "output"
(games played and level of exposure). 33 By controlling both the means
and the ends of production, a cartel is able to set a quantity and a
price that is optimal to the cartel.
In economic theory, cartels provide strong incentives for
individual members to "cheat" through competitive advantage. 34 As
with all cartels, the NCAA's member institutions retain their
individual identities and seek to maximize their individual return by
taking advantage of the structure governing the collective. The NCAA
has dealt with this issue by instituting a system in which member
35
institutions must remain in good standing with the NCAA's bylaws.
Violations of the NCAA's constitution and bylaws can result in
36
sanctions or expulsion from membership in the NCAA.

31.
See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Easterbrook, J.) (acknowledging that "[m]any scholars understand the NCAA as a cartel,
having power in the markets for athletes," and that "[tihe NCAA treats this [amateurism]
as desirable preservation of amateur sports; a more jaundiced eye would see it as the use of
monopsony power to obtain athletes' services for less than the competitive market price").
32.
Id. at 1225.
33.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1585 (citing FLEISHER, supra note 10, at 5); see
FLEISHER, supra note 10, at 7-9 (providing the factors of a cartel structure in the context of
the NCAA: (1) open collusion among members; (2) revenues to members have increased
while "compensation" to student-athletes has remained constant; (3) exclusion of regulation
of school brand-names; (4) marginal value of education provided to student-athletes is
significantly lower than the value of their performance to the school; and (5) illicit
payments to student-athletes which suggest "the presence of rents attempting to find their
way into the relevant input").
34.
See JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS 426-27 (2d ed. 2001) ("[I]t is in
each firm's best interest for all other firms to honor the cartel agreement-thus driving up
the market price-while it ignores the agreement and makes extra, profitable sales at the
high price.").
35.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 183; Konsky, supra note 4, at 1585.
36.
See generally NCAA CONST. art. 3 (detailing the requirements for membership).
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Self-regulation is a necessary component to establishing a
successful cartel. Because production can only be controlled if each
member institution complies, the cartel is only effective if its rules are
aimed at curbing incentives to cheat. For the NCAA, one such rule is
the Transfer Rule, which removes any potential incentive, on the part
of both the student-athlete and the member institution, to recruit
players from other programs. Viewing the Transfer Rule through the
lens of cartel theory suggests that it is an anti-cheating mechanism
designed to protect the interests of the cartel over the individual
interests of member institutions.
With few exceptions, cartels are an illegal form of business
organization. Courts have struggled with the application of this
general rule to the NCAA, and have swayed between re-characterizing
the system altogether and implicitly accepting the cartel structure but
carving out an exception to the application of antitrust law. While
Tarkanianlargely forecloses constitutional challenges to the Transfer
Rule, other legal grounds are available for student-athletes. As more
courts begin to accept that the NCAA is a cartel and not a benign
institution, 37 antitrust challenges may become more of a threat to the
38
NCAA.
2. NCAA v. Board of Regents
39
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
40
considered "one of the most important court cases in sports history,"
the Supreme Court held that the "actions of the NCAA in the
broadcast rights market for college football did violate the antitrust
laws. Output was restricted and prices were raised above the level
41
that would prevail under a more competitive bidding structure."
While the Court firmly acknowledged that "[t]he NCAA plays a critical
role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college
sports," and that the NCAA "needs ample latitude to play that role,"
the Court explained that this latitude is not absolute and held that
"rules that restrict output are hardly consistent with this role."42

See, e.g., Walters, 997 F.2d at 1224-25 (describing the NCAA as a cartel
37.
suppressing athletes' income below market value).
See Konsky, supra note 4, at 1589 (noting that, while the NCAA's traditional
38.
immunity from antitrust challenge has been undermined, few of such challenges have been
successful as of yet).
39.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85
(1984).
40.

RODNEY D. FORT, SPORTS ECONOMICS 435 (2003).

41.
42.

Id. at 436.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
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This basic approach should be carried over to other antitrust
challenges to NCAA rules and regulations given the nature of the
NCAA. While latitude is appropriate, rules which are not "consistent"
with the core function of the NCAA should be subject to heightened
scrutiny, as they were in Board of Regents. To the extent that rules
foster the "revered tradition of amateurism," they should be examined
with deference; to the extent that those same rules are used as a
mechanism for strengthening the cartel, they should be viewed
critically.
Board of Regents also illustrates the tension between the
various conferences within the NCAA, which is a potential source of
future conflict as the power of these conferences continues to grow.
Recently, conferences have toiled with the prospect of modifying
conference rules that may conflict with those of the NCAA. 43 As a
cartel, the NCAA is likely to resist such challenges which represent a
threat to its market control. Currently profits are controlled by a
select group of "administrators, athletic directors, and coaches."' 44
With the concept of the NCAA as a cartel and the logic of the
Board of Regents opinion as focusing points, this note will now shift to
the inner workings of the NCAA.
C. Defining IntercollegiateAthletics: The World in Which the NCAA
Operates
The world of intercollegiate athletics in 2006 is very different
from what it was in 1906. "The NCAA is an association of schools
which compete against each other to attract television revenues, not to
mention fans and athletes" in a market worth billions of dollars. 4 5
According to the NCAA constitution, one of the central purposes of the
NCAA is to "promote and develop educational leadership, physical
fitness, athletics excellence and athletics participation as a
recreational pursuit."46 Thus, amateurism and academic achievement
are guiding principles underlying NCAA action.

43.
Bud Withers, Pac-lO Notebook: An Idea Eligible for the Dustbin, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/sports/
2002095197_withersl9.html ('The Pac-10 is advancing a proposal to the NCAA that would
allow the immediate transfer of athletes who currently are required to sit out a year before
they become eligible at their new school.").
44.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1585.
45.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99.
46.
NCAA CONST. § 1.2.
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1. Amateurism
The NCAA traditionally has been portrayed by insiders and the
courts alike as an organization regulating "amateur" athletics. 47 As an
institution, the NCAA characterizes itself as a protector of amateur
sports, holding "amateurism as a central goal." 48 Despite the NCAA's
desire to "retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate
athletics and professional sports,"4 9 it has been argued that this line
"is faint and fading fast."50 Commentators and scholars challenge the
"amateur" status of the NCAA. 51 Common sense and practical
experience suggest that participation at the college level is required
for a professional athletic career in revenue-generating sports. Such a
system blurs the line between professional and college sports by its
very nature.
The apparent shift away from pure amateurism is most
profound in revenue-generating sports, 5 2 in which the NCAA enters
into contracts worth billions of dollars. 53 While Justice White
characterized the NCAA as an "unincorporated, nonprofit, educational
association" in his Board of Regents dissent, the NCAA has arguably
moved even further from that characterization since 1984. 54 This big
business exists even where the NCAA "manages not to pay its
principal producers a wage or a salary."55 Although the NCAA
constitution
requires
delineation between
professional
and
intercollegiate athletics, the current system (at least with regard to
56
revenue-generating sports) is arguably one of "unpaid professionals."
The courts have allowed the NCAA freedom in organizing and
applying its rules to both institutions and individual student-athletes.

47.
Bd.of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
48.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1583; see NCAA CONST. § 1.3.1 ("A basic purpose of
this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so
doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports.").
49.
NCAA CONST.§ 1.3.1.
50.
Melvin L. Braziel, United We Stand: Organizing Student-Athletes for
EducationalReform, 4 SPORTS LAW J. 81, 83 (1997).
51.
See generally Konsky, supra note 4, at 1584.
52.
Id. at 1581 (stating that revenue-generating sports are typically men's
basketball, football, and ice hockey).
53.
Id. at 1584 ("In revenue sports, amateurism is arguably a relic of the past.").
54.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
120 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
55.

ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICTS

IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 6 (Princeton 1999).
56.
Id. at 53.
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The maintenance of amateurism as a central principle in all sports
may be a vital component in ensuring the preservation of this
freedom.5 7 The dissent by Justices White and Scalia in Board of
Regents was based on the understanding that the NCAA and its
''members seek to provide a public good-a viable system of amateur
athletics."5 8 This belief was used to justify their position that the
NCAA's actions were not "purely commercial." 59 If the amateurism
status of the NCAA is diluted, a court may question whether the
NCAA is regulating a noncommercial market as its core function,
which in turn could erode the deference traditionally granted by the
courts, especially as to antitrust challenges.
2. The Education Principle
The second guiding principle of the NCAA constitution and
bylaws is a commitment to operating the intercollegiate athletics
systems "as an integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body." 60 The NCAA achieves
this goal by establishing basic minimum academic requirements for all
student-athletes. 61 This dedication to education is used by courts as a
primary justification for recognizing amateurism in college athletics.
Individuals who choose to participate in intercollegiate
athletics are required to have "minimum scores on college entrance
exams and to have satisfactorily completed standard core high school
courses." 62 In addition, once enrolled and participating in a sport, the
student-athlete is required to maintain a designated grade point
average and to maintain a certain course load each semester. 63 While
critics have challenged their rigor, these rules nonetheless represent a
threshold of classroom competence, both before and during
64
participation in college athletics.
The major criticism of these academic requirements concerns
both their centrality and legitimacy. 65 Critics argue that athletics are

57.
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987)
("Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional
governmental function.").
58.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 122 (White, J., dissenting).
59.
Id. at 121 (White, J., dissenting).

60.

NCAA CONST. § 1.3.1.

61.
62.

See NCAA BYLAW § 14.01.2.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1583 (citing ZIMBALIST, supra note 55, at 32-33).

63.

Id.

64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 1583 n.16 (citing Christopher L. Chin, Comment, Ilegal Procedures: The
NCAA's Unlawful Restraint of the Student-Athlete, 26 LOYOLA L. REV. 1213, 1234 (1993)
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designed to be a part of the "educational system" of the students, and
that the academic requirements are often mere puffery. 66 This is most
likely the case in programs that consistently compete at the highest
level.6 7 Generally speaking, however, graduation rates indicate that
education takes a back seat to athletic performance. 68 There has been
growing concern that certain student-athletes "do just enough
academically to remain eligible for athletic competition."69 The
question is whether the NCAA facilitates this environment through a
high stakes game where money and endorsements are awarded to
winning teams. The balance between maximization of profit and
adherence to guiding principles is a calculus that the members of the
NCAA must make.
The rigor of these various academic requirements has also been
called into question. The NCAA bylaws require minimum GPAs and
enrollment hours, but there is evidence suggesting that loopholes
allow athletes to mitigate the effect of these requirements by enrolling
in "athlete" classes which are less strenuous than mainstream
courses. 70 Such a system runs counter to the basic principle: "The
admission, academic standing and academic progress of studentathletes shall be consistent with the policies and standards adopted by
the institution for the student body in general." 71 This arguably
flawed system, full of loopholes, reinforces a "class system" in which
athletes are seen as an entirely different class of students. 72 The
maintenance of college athletics' amateur status is invariably tied to

("[Tihe NCAA's academic goals are fallacious because neither the NCAA nor the studentathlete pursues them."); Rick Telander, Something Must be Done, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Oct. 2, 1989, at 92) (asserting that "the nation's universities are shamelessly exploiting the
players and debasing themselves by perpetuating the myth of the 'amateur student
athlete"')).
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1583.
66.
67.
Id.
68.
See Steve Weiberg, BCS Schools Don't Measure Up, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2002,
at 3C. But see Welch Suggs, Athletes' Graduation Rates Hit All-Time High, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 4, 2002, at 47.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1583; see Braziel, supra note 50, at 85 (suggesting that
69.
preparation time puts a burden on education).
See, e.g., Press Release, NCAA Infraction Appeals Committee, Howard
70.
University Public Infractions Appeals Committee Report (July 16, 2002), at § III.E,
(providing an
available at http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2002071601in.htm
example of certain classes which are arranged for athletes, as well as an example of the
type of investigation undertaken in these situations: "Student-athletes C and D were
enrolled in a recreation course in the fall 1994 semester. The class was for three hours of
credit. Both student-athletes were awarded grades of "A" even though they attended no
.
classes and did not complete any assignments or examinations .
71.
NCAA CONST. § 2.5.
ZIMBALIST, supra note 55, at 12.
72.
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the connection between the student-athlete and the education he is
receiving.
It is within this general framework that the NCAA Transfer
Rule exists. The regulations adopted by the NCAA are designed to
foster the goals of the NCAA, ensure the protection of the brand, and
to further the interests of the individual member institutions.
D. The NCAA Transfer Rule
The Transfer Rule illustrates the competing interests between
student-athletes and the member institutions that comprise the
NCAA. 73

The Rule states that a "student who transfers . . . to a

member institution from any collegiate institution is required to
complete one full academic year of residence at the certifying
institution before being eligible to compete for or to receive travel
expenses from the member institution. . ... ,,74 Eligibility is not lost

during this transfer year, but all eligibility must be used within a five
year period which begins at the original institution. 75 The NCAA
"Transfer Regulations" also include a thorough explanation of the
term "residence." 76 In general, transfers between different four-year
Division I schools are the most difficult and are the least likely to be
exempted. 77 The Transfer Rule emphasizes the form of the transferfor example, moving from Division I to Division II-rather than the
motivations behind the transfer. 78 This section analyzes the ability of
the Transfer Rule to further the rationales traditionally used to
substantiate its use.
1. Current Implementation of the Transfer Rule
In practice, the Transfer Rule restricts the movement of
players between member institutions by placing a one-year penalty on
a student-athlete for changing schools. The Transfer Rule gives both
the individual institutions and the intercollegiate athletic system

73.
See NCAA BYLAW § 14.5.
74.
NCAA BYLAW § 14.5.11. The NCAA has recently adjusted the bylaws regulating
whether students who transfer from a four-year college can receive financial aid during
their transfer year; these modifications become effective August 1, 2007. See id. §
14.5.5.1.1-2.
75.
NCAA BYLAW § 14.5; see Konsky, supra note 4, at 1586 ("Practically, then, a
student-athlete wishing to use his maximum four years of athletic eligibility can transfer
colleges only once.").

76.

NCAA BYLAW § 14.5.1.1.

77.
78.

Konsky, supra note 4, at 1586.
Id.
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more stability and predictability by restricting player mobility.
However, such a restriction also reduces the "optimal matching of
players and teams." 79 Without the one-year penalty, players would not
be able to transfer to schools and teams that value them the most.
With the penalty year, players are forced to consider academic and
athletic costs of the one-year penalty when deciding whether to
transfer. In this way, the Transfer rule actually undermines the basic
purpose of the NCAA as an institution that "strives to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body."8 0 While input
efficiency in the talent market should not be a driving force in a
system with these goals at its core, the restriction should not be so
burdensome that it inhibits student-athletes from seeking out the
most optimal match along both academic and athletic lines.8 1
Therefore, the rigor of the Transfer Rule needs to be examined to
understand the dynamics of these competing interests.
The existence of the Transfer Rule supports the categorization
of the NCAA as a cartel. Seeking to regulate inputs and outputs at a
systemic level, the Transfer Rule's rationales are likely to be analyzed
and applied differently when viewed through the lens of cartel theory.
The one broad Transfer Rule exception that exists is valid only for a
"sport other than basketball, Division I-A football or men's ice
hockey."8 2 Thus, the sports that typically have the potential to create
revenue are specifically excluded from the exception 3-that is, they
are specifically subject to the Transfer Rule. The structure of the Rule
ensures stability in sports that generate the most revenue.

79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 1582.
Id. at 1583.

82.
NCAA BYLAW § 14.5.5.2.10(a); see also id. § 14.5.1 ("In the sport of basketball a
transfer student-athlete who satisfies the applicable transfer requirements or receives an

exception or waiver as set forth in this section, but initially enrolls as a full-time student
subsequent to the first term of the academic year shall not be eligible for competition until
the ensuing academic year.").
83.
See id. § 14.5.5.2.10(a).
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2. Exceptions to the NCAA Transfer Rule
Besides the broad exception mentioned above, most of the
exceptions to the Transfer Rule within the NCAA rules apply in very
specific circumstances.8 4 These specific exceptions are unlikely to
85
apply to most student-athletes seeking to evade the Transfer Rule.
The "One-Time Exception" clause of the Transfer Rule requires the
student-athlete to meet four conditions.8 6 Unless each condition is
satisfied, the exemption is not available and the student-athlete is left
either to find another specific exemption or to seek a permissive
87
waiver from the NCAA Management Council.
The failure of the NCAA to institute an exception policy
consistent with the very rationales that have been suggested for its
legitimacy may dilute the Transfer Rule's validity. While courts have
been deferential to the NCAA in making policy, even in situations
where the rule "may produce unreasonable results in certain
situations,"8 8 the changing dynamics of the NCAA should encourage
courts to play a greater role in guaranteeing that the policy rationales
for the Transfer Rule are realized.
Challenges to the Transfer Rule, as well as other NCAA rules
and procedures, have been brought on antitrust grounds.8 9 Such
challenges are likely to continue given the holdings in Tarkanian and
Board of Regents.90 Despite this opposition, courts have consistently

84.
See, e.g., id. § 14.5.5.2.2 (Exchange Student Exception); id. § 14.5.5.2.3
(Discontinued Academic Program Exception); id. § 14.5.5.2.5 (Military Service, Church
Mission Exception).
85.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1586.
86.
The rules require that:
(a) The student is a participant in a sport other than basketball, Division I-A
football, or men's ice hockey at the institution to which the student is
transferring...
(b) The student has not transferred previously from one four-year institution...
(c) The student is in good academic standing and meets the progress toward
degree requirements...
(d) If the student is transferring from a NCAA or NAIA member institution, the
student's previous institution shall certify in writing that it has no objection to
the student's being granted an exception to the transfer-residence requirement.
NCAA BYLAW § 14.5.5.2. 10.
87.
NCAA BYLAw § 14.8.1.2.
88.
Shelton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1976).
89.
See generally Konsky, supra note 4. For a definition of what constitutes
"antitrust" grounds, see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (making illegal "[elvery
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States").
90.
See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198-99 (1988)
(largely foreclosing constitutional challenges to NCAA rules, holding that the NCAA is not
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ruled in favor of the NCAA and upheld application of the Transfer
Rule. 9 1 While Board of Regents92 may represent a shift in the way
courts analyze antitrust challenges to NCAA policies, a general
reluctance to subject the NCAA to full scrutiny remains. 93 The NCAA
is a private institution that: "perform[s] a public function in
overseeing the nation's intercollegiate athletics." 94 Claims challenging
the Transfer Rule on antitrust grounds are generally dismissed
because the Sherman antitrust laws govern commercial activity, and
courts have reasoned that these challenges to the NCAA's rules and
procedures are "essentially 'noncommercial' in nature."95 Yet the
evolution of the NCAA suggests that it is becoming an association
rooted in the regulation of commercial activity. As the justification for
weak application of the Sherman Act is diluted by the NCAA's gradual
movement away from solely protecting amateurism, courts will likely
be more suspicious of the motivations behind the rules and its ability
to promote its own policies.
II. THE RATIONALES FOR THE TRANSFER RULE
Instead of offering a facial challenge to the residency
requirement, this note will focus on whether the rationales of the
Transfer Rule are furthered by the Rule as it exists today. These
rationales, especially to "as applied" challenges, may become more
significant as a result of the increasingly "commercial" nature of the
96
activities of the NCAA.

a state actor); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85
(1984) (representing a successful antitrust challenge brought against the NCAA,
demonstrating the Court's willingness to apply a quick look rule of reason analysis even to

NCAA decisions when such an approach is warranted).
91.
See, e.g., Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001); McHale v.
Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 69 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
92.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85.
93.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1589 ("While Board of Regents clearly overturned the
presumption that the NCAA is automatically exempt from antitrust scrutiny, few
successful antitrust challenges to the NCAA policies have been waged since. Courts often
find NCAA regulations not to be antitrust violations because either: (1) they are not
sufficiently commercial to be subject to antitrust scrutiny; or (2) their procompetitive
effects trump their anticompetitive effects.").
94.
McHale, 620 F. Supp. at 70.
95.
See, e.g., Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062 (citing the district court opinion)
96.
See Tibor Nagy, The "Blind Look" Rule of Reason: Federal Courts' Peculiar
Treatment of NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 332-33 (2005)
(recognizing that "[c]ollege athletes have repeatedly brought suit to challenge the NCAA's
bylaws, principally on antitrust grounds, and they will undoubtedly continue to do so . ..
All of this, the courts have held, is justified not by any economic reasons but by the NCAA's
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A. TraditionalRationales for the Transfer Rule
The NCAA was created to promote "the organization's
academic and amateurism goals." 97 On its face, the regulation of
transfers between member institutions helps to further these general
goals. 98 It is rational for the NCAA to adopt some limitation on the
transfer of student-athletes given the obvious adjustment costs
associated with transferring to a different institution. . However, the
rules and mechanisms adopted to curb transfers should be evaluated
in accordance with their ability to promote the goals of the NCAA and
the rationales for regulating transfers between member bodies.
In McHale v. Cornell University, the NCAA argued that the
purposes of the Transfer Rule were: "(1) to prevent transfers solely for
athletic reasons, (2) to avoid exploitation of student athletes, and (3) to
allow transfer students time to adjust to their new environment." 99
Thus, the residency requirement and its existing line-item exceptions
should be examined in accordance with these three core rationales.
The central issue is whether the current Rule serves the functions it
was designed to perform.
1. Preventing Transfers Solely For Athletic Reasons
The first rationale for the Transfer Rule-to prevent transfers
solely for athletic reasons-is rooted in the NCAA's core goal of
amateurism. This goal is widely accepted as a legitimate purpose, but
litigation surrounding amateurism has centered on the application of
the "means chosen by the NCAA to achieve it."100 Disallowing
transfers solely for athletic purposes furthers the goal of amateurism
by penalizing student-athletes for making decisions without
considering the externalities associated with transferring, such as
harm to their academic pursuits. Yet, after examining the residency
requirement penalty and specified exemptions, it is evident that this

purported desire to ensure that college athletes 'be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises."').
97.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1587 (noting the NCAA's stated intent to "provide a
better environment for the student-athlete's collegiate experience and to establish
appropriate standards to govern the manner in which institutions compete with each other
both on and off the playing field" (quoting NCAA 2002-03 TRANSFER GUIDE at
Introduction)).
98.
See id.
McHale, 620 F. Supp. at 68 n.4.
99.
100.
Shelton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1976).
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purported rationale for the Transfer Rule is "both chimerical and
disingenuous."101
A rational extension of this stated justification would be to
exempt student-athletes who wish to transfer for laudable reasons
completely unrelated to athletics, such as for purely academic
pursuits. Within the Transfer Rule, however, there is no blanket
exemption for those student-athletes who wish to transfer solely for
academic reasons.1 0 2 If one of the most "basic" purposes of the NCAA
is to facilitate amateurism, i.e., "a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports," an exception for
those student-athletes wishing to transfer solely for academic reasons
seems to further this most "basic purpose."1 0 3 Despite this seemingly
logical conclusion, the NCAA has not expanded the line-item
exceptions to include an exception for those student-athletes wishing
to transfer for academic reasons. The exceptions are mostly structural
and focus largely on whether the transfer will result in a change in
division. 104
One potential problem could be the implementation of such an
exemption. While an exception solely for academic reasons may be
ideal in practice, it could theoretically be used by student-athletes as a
catch-all exemption. The NCAA would have to engage in very case
specific analyses and rely heavily on fact finding. However, there is no
reason to suspect that an exception for academic reasons would not be
as specific and demanding as the existing exemptions on the petitioner
to establish facts consistent with the exception. 05 Applying an
academic exception to the Transfer Rule would signal the NCAA's
recognition that transfers solely for academic reasons are perfectly
legitimate.

101.

Ray Yasser, A Comprehensive Blueprint for the Reform of Intercollegiate

Athletics, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 123, 148 (1993).

102.
See NCAA BYLAW § 14.5.5.2.10. The rules do not allow a student-athlete to
transfer schools as a way of avoiding academic requirements, nor do they allow for an
exception to the residency requirement for those students who wish to transfer solely for
academic reasons. There is no blanket exemption for such a purpose and academic
exemptions are not one of the available waivers under bylaw § 14.8.1.2. See id. § 14.8.1.2.
Given that "[o]ther than these, there shall be no waiver by the Association of any of the
provision of this bylaw," there is no exemption. See id. § 14.8.
103.
NCAA CONST. § 1.3.1 ("The competitive athletics program of member
institutions are designed to be a vital part of the educational system. A basic purpose of
this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body ....
").
104.
See generally NCAA BYLAWS § 14.5.5.2 (introducing the various exceptions for
transfers from four-year colleges).
105.
See, e.g., id. §§ 14.5.5.2.1-6.

456

VANDERBILT J. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH.LAW

[Vol. 9:2:439

As with many agencies, fact finding and case-by-case analysis
are at the core of how NCAA Committees operate. 10 6 The difficulty in
implementing an academic exemption would be mitigated by the fact
that the current system is one predicated on narrow exemptions, and
all cases outside of a few narrow circumstances are handled by
committees. 10 7 Extending the Rule's exemption policies would narrow
the discretion with which an appellate body can grant exemptions and
make its findings appear more aligned with the NCAA's amateurism
goals. In addition, the allowance of an exception for academic reasons
would provide the student-athlete with an identifiable provision upon
which to rest his claim for waiver. An academic exception for transfers
would strengthen the NCAA's position that the Transfer Rule is
designed in part to thwart attempts to transfer solely for athletic
108
reasons.
It is true that within the current system, student-athletes can
appeal rulings against them, if their case does not fall within the
narrow exceptions available under the rules. 10 9 However, case history
suggests that the NCAA has not adopted a policy of granting
exemptions in all cases where the student-athlete seeks to transfer
solely on academic grounds. In McHale v. Cornell University, the
plaintiff sought an exemption from the residency requirement in his
request to transfer from the University of Maryland to Cornell
University. McHale argued that he was transferring solely for
"academic reasons" and thus "his competing [would] not subvert the
purposes of the rule."110 The NCAA advised Cornell that McHale did
not "qualify for a waiver" and therefore would be required to sit out
one year under the terms of the rule.1 11 McHale's case exhibits the
NCAA's apparent reluctance to grant waiver in situations where the
student-athlete is transferring to a different school for non-athletic
reasons.1 1 2 Thus, a change in the exception policy would not be merely
a codification of an informal policy that the NCAA has instituted
113
through the traditional appeals process.
106.

See, e.g., id. §§ 32.1-3 (detailing the requisite procedures to be taken during

review of alleged violations).
See Konsky, supra note 4, at 1586.
107.
See McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 68 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
108.

109.

NCAA BYLAW § 14.12.1.

McHale, 620 F. Supp. at 68.
110.
Id. Cornell University, as a member institution of the NCAA, is obligated to
111.
comply with the rulings of the NCAA as a condition to their membership. Id. While the
plaintiffs claim was filed against Cornell and the NCAA, it is the decision of the NCAA
that is at issue. See id.
Id. at 68-69.
112.
Id. at 68.
113.
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By refusing to explicitly allow transfers for academic reasons,
student-athletes may be persuaded not to transfer and thereby make a
decision contrary to the best interests of their academic pursuits.
Cases such as McHale demonstrate the NCAA's caution in granting
such exceptions. 114 The difficulty in obtaining a waiver and the
general uncertainty in the process may dissuade student-athletes from
making decisions in their best interest.1 15 The waiver system and
cases like McHale suggest that the rules are designed to prevent
transfers broadly, rather than to merely prevent those transfers based
solely on athletic motivations. 11 6 "[T]he rigidity of the Transfer Rule"
and the nature of its exceptions, coupled with the waiver system
which accompanies it, "belies the argument that the NCAA is
117
primarily concerned with academics."
2. Avoiding the Exploitation of Student Athletes
A second rationale offered by the NCAA for the Transfer Rule
is that it helps to avoid the exploitation of student-athletes. 1 8 To
further this end, the NCAA must assume that the typical studentathlete has such a high degree of naivet6 that it must act in a
paternalistic fashion. This rationale also assumes that it is always in
the best interest of the student-athlete to not seek a transfer.
While the NCAA was originally forged to address imminent
concerns related to player safety on the field, its expansion into nearly
every facet of college athletics has shifted its focus away from
protecting student-athletes to becoming an organizing principle for its
member institutions. 119 The original mandate of the NCAA was to
address problems with the cohesion of rules of play and extraneous
policies between colleges and universities, problems which were so
profound that they affected the safety of student-athletes.120 Yet today

114.
115.

Id.
Id.

116.

Until recently the only exception that explicitly dealt with a student's academic

situation was Rule 14.5.5.2.3, Discontinued Academic Program Exception ("The student
changed institutions in order to continue a major course of study because the original
institution discontinued the academic program in the student's major."). NCAA BYLAW §
14.5.5.2.3. However, effective August 1, 2005, the rules now allow a student-athlete to
transfer without the one-year penalty if that student-athlete has graduated and is
transferring to pursue a graduate degree. See NCAA BYLAW § 14.1.9.1.
117.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1598.
118.
McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 68 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
119.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
99 (1984).
120.
NCAA.org, History, supra note 3.
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there is a strong argument that this original purpose for the NCAA
has been supplemented by the somewhat paradoxical desire of the
member institutions to work collectively in order to further individual
interests. 121 A plain reading of the Transfer Rule fails to yield a clear
connection between its strictures and avoiding the exploitation of
student-athletes.
Most scholars sharply contrast the NCAA with a paternalistic
organization that watches over the best interests of the studentathletes competing within the system. 122 The rules and regulations of
the NCAA apply to the "member institutions," rather than directly to
the student-athletes.1 23 While the NCAA's interests are undoubtedly
not in complete conflict with those of the student-athletes, the
Transfer Rule is "arguably meant to further schools' commercial
interests in maintaining high-quality athletic programs at a low
cost."1 24 The NCAA enforces the regulations it implements by
sanctioning the member institutions who do not comply, thus
1 25
protecting the interests of the collective.
Restrictions on transfer in a system that upholds amateurism
should be based on the best interest of the student-athlete rather than
on the interests of member institutions. Ultimately, the Rule
mitigates the possibility that member institutions will attempt to
"cheat" the system by recruiting players already playing for competing
member institutions. 126 Mechanisms designed to deter such "cheating"
127
are often signals to economists that a cartel system is present.
When viewed as a cartel, the NCAA seems more concerned with
preventing member institutions from exploiting the NCAA than with
preventing the exploitation of student-athletes.
3. Allowing Transfer Students Time to Adjust to Their New
Environment

The third rationale offered for the Transfer Rule is that the
Rule provides transfer students with time to adjust to their new

See generally FLEISHER, supra note 10 (hashing out the case for the NCAA as a
121.
cartel).
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1596.
122.
123.
NCAA CONST. § 1.3.2 (stating that the member institutions have the obligation
to "apply and enforce this legislation").
124.
Konsky, supra note 4, at 1596.
Id. at 1585.
125.
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
126.
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
127.
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environment. 128 This rationale is similar to the last in its depiction of
the NCAA as a paternalistic organization looking out for the best
interests of the student-athletes.
While this purpose may be legitimate, the current exemptions
and appeals process do not further its alleged rationale. Certain
exceptions specifically allow students to forego this "necessary" period
of adjustment. Waiver of the residency requirement is granted as a
line-item exception to those students who are transferring from junior
129
colleges to four-year colleges and universities in certain situations.
It seems inconsistent with the foregoing policy, however, to grant
waivers in situations where students are transferring from community
colleges to four-year institutions, as the academic, social, and athletic
cultures of these two types of institutions are likely to be the most
juxtaposed. 130 By refusing to grants exceptions to students who
transfer to schools with dramatically different environments, the
Transfer Rule is not aligned with its purpose. 131
Requiring a year of residency before competing to justify a
necessary adjustment period seems out of step with the general
process of becoming a student-athlete. The NCAA is comfortable
allowing a first-year student fresh out of high school to compete in his
first semester of matriculation at a member institution, yet is wary
that individuals transferring to often similar institutions are
incapable of adjusting properly. 132 Requiring a full year of residency,
as opposed to alternative time periods such as full or half semesters,
thus significantly dilutes the relationship between the Transfer Rule
and the best interest of the student-athletes.
B. The "Real Rationale" Underlying the Residency Requirement of the
NCAA Transfer Rule
After analyzing these three rationales, 133 it does not appear
that the existing Transfer Rule is designed to further them. Rather, it
is likely that there is a fourth rationale not clearly embodied in case
law or NCAA rhetoric. "Athletic looting," or allowing members to
34 If
recruit and compete for active players, is a destabilizing practice.
student-athletes are allowed to transfer at-will with little
128.

McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 68 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).

129.

See NCAA BYLAW §§ 14.5.4.1-2.

130.

Konsky, supra note 4, at 1598.

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
McHale, 620 F. Supp. at 68.
Withers, supra note 43.
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consequence, institutions may be forced to constantly compete for each
other's players, resulting in an unstable system. 135 In addition, such a
system increases the operating costs of athletic departments.
Although never articulated by the NCAA, the rationale is to combat a
potential floodgates problem and provide stability for member
institutions who collectively act as a cartel.
Recognizing value in regulating the transfer of studentathletes, and recognizing that the current rule scheme fails to
completely further its purported goals, it becomes apparent that
change is needed. This is not to suggest that the NCAA should be
forbidden from making rules that conflict with the interests of its
student-athletes. While the NCAA serves a public function, it also
serves the interests of the members themselves. 136 When the NCAA is
engaged in legitimate rule making that promotes something other
than amateurism, the standard of judicial review should be
heightened. 13 7 Given the changing nature of the NCAA, some of its
rationales no longer aim to serve a public function, which should have
a dramatic impact when reviewing challenges to its policies.
III. ADJUSTMENT: ALIGNING THE RULE WITH ITS RATIONALES
There are two likely paths to instigate change. First, advocates
can rely on the NCAA to voluntarily change its rules and find a better
balance of its stated rationales with the interests of student-athletes.
For example, one recent decision allowed students who have
graduated from an undergraduate institution to transfer to another
institution without being subject to the residency requirement if they
are pursuing graduate studies and have remaining eligibility. Like
other exceptions, this rule is narrow and unlikely to affect the

135.

The NCAA has argued:

[N]ot only will the NCAA be harmed if the requested relief is granted, the
NCAA's other member institutions will be harmed if this Court orders the NCAA
to waive its transfer rules as to Plaintiff and orders the NCAA to allow Plaintiff
to compete despite her ineligibility ....
The uniform enforcement of the rules at
all member institutions is necessary to preserve fair competition and the
integrity of the respective sports (issues at the very center of the NCAA's mission
and purpose).
Brief of Petitioner at *17, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Yeo, 171 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2003)
(No. 03-0753), 2004 WL 1810919 (citing NCAA Motion to Dissolve at 17).
136.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 n.18 (1988)
("Quite properly, [Tarkanian] does not point to the NCAA's overriding function of fostering
amateur athletics at the college level. For while we have described that function as
"critical," by no means is it a traditional, let alone an exclusive, state function") (citations
omitted).
137.
Id. at 198.
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majority of student athletes. Nevertheless, the rule demonstrates that
the NCAA can adjust its rules regulating transfer to better promote its
stated goals.
Through the lens of cartel theory, the following would seem to
hold: The NCAA, as a body of member institutions, benefits from a
strict Transfer Rule because it allows for stability and predictability.
Student-athletes benefit from a rule regulating transfer only to the
extent that it furthers the overall utility of their experiences. Since the
institutions that constitute the NCAA have a direct voice in the rules
that it adopts, it is likely that- the Transfer Rule will remain as it is
unless outside bodies force change.
A. Changing the Standardof Review
The NCAA of today is very different from the NCAA at its
founding. The NCAA exists independent of its student-athletes and
member institutions. It is unclear whether the interests of the
student-athletes are completely aligned with the interests of the
NCAA. As long as courts continue to give the traditional level of
deference to the NCAA, which has evolved into a quasi-voluntary
organization, the rules are unlikely to change. As a justification for
heightened scrutiny, courts should recognize that the NCAA's
concerns are not limited to the noble cause of creating a "public
138
good."
The characterization of the NCAA as an "unincorporated,
nonprofit, educational association" has justified a loose rational basis
standard of review.13 9 Yet this description of the NCAA is no longer
reasonable, and therefore must be changed. The change, however,
need not be dramatic. Under the principle of stare decisis, it is
unlikely and perhaps unwise to dramatically redefine the relationship
between the NCAA and antitrust laws. Change can result by adjusting
the level of deference. In fact, prior cases can be distinguished by
simply recognizing that the NCAA itself has evolved into a different
Association and therefore warrants a different standard of review.
Requiring the NCAA to evaluate its rationales for the Transfer
Rule to specific cases in litigation may force the NCAA to rethink the
Rule's legitimacy. The Supreme Court did this in a different context in
Board of Regents. The Court declined to conclude that the NCAA's

138.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
122 (1984).
Id.
139.
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interest in amateurism "justifies the regulation challenged."'140
Instead, while still granting a certain degree of "latitude" to the
NCAA, the Court balanced the NCAA's justifications and rationales
against those offered by the petitioner. 141 The Court held that "the
NCAA has restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate
athletics in the Nation's life."1 4 2 An extension of this type of analysis
to challenges of the residency requirement may force the NCAA to
adjust its policies to ensure that it can justify the Rule. After
Tarkanianit is clear that any such challenges will only be successful if
waged under the Sherman Act.
In this way, all that may be required of courts is the
recognition that the NCAA will no longer be granted the level of
deference it has traditionally been granted on policy decisions
affecting the interests of student-athletes. Student-athletes are not
represented in the NCAA, have no voice in NCAA decision-making,
and yet are dramatically affected by the actions of the NCAA. Member
institutions, as members of a cartel, engage in rule-making, largely
left to their own discretion. Such a power imbalance can be mitigated
by engaging in a heightened standard of review. Simply requiring that
the NCAA not only state its rationales for the Rule, but also explain
how those rationales are furthered by the challenged policy in specific
situations may initiate internal change. If courts continue to defer to
the NCAA even when it produces "unreasonable results," as in
43
Shelton, it is unlikely that the Transfer Rule will ever be amended.
B. NCAA Action
Until pressure is placed on the NCAA to seriously reexamine
the Transfer Rule, it is unlikely that any change will occur. .If courts
demand a showing of alignment between the Rule and its rationales, it
is possible that the NCAA may take certain incremental steps to help
align the reasons stated in McHale with the rules and procedures
implemented.

14 4

First, the interests would be aligned by an expansion of the
Transfer Rule exceptions. As previously stated, one such example of
this expansion is the "One-time Transfer Exception," read in
combination with general eligibility rules which allows for an
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exception for graduate students with remaining eligibility. Further
allowances for transfers rooted in academic purpose, would give
guidance to student-athletes and create a system that recognizes the
importance of educational aspirations in addition to preserving
amateurism.
Second, greater detail and flexibility within the Transfer Rule
would help to align the Rule with its rationales. A blanket one-year
"adjustment period" seems arbitrary in certain situations, especially
when a student-athlete transfers to a school that is similar to his or
her former school, either geographically or academically. 145 Rule
flexibility, designed in accordance with the specific factors that
warrant an adjustment period, will strengthen the connection between
the rationales for the Rule and the Rule itself. The current procedure
is based on a case-by-case analysis. Such a system would allow for a
smooth transition from a strict one-year requirement to an individual
analysis in accordance with the rationales for the Rule.
Recently, there has been much debate over whether the "OneTime Transfer Exception" should be amended. 146 A proposal to waive
the current restriction on Division I Football, Basketball, and Hockey
was proposed for 2006, but it was rejected as in years past. 14 7 In
addition, conferences may take a more active role by collectively
modifying their own conference transfer rules and by voting on
modifications to the current NCAA Transfer Rule. 148 Despite these
potential avenues of change, the current Rule remains.
As recently as last year, the NCAA demonstrated its apparent
unyielding commitment to the Rule. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, student-athletes from Tulane, the University of New
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http://org.elon.edu/ncaafara/DI-LRCO5.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2007) (including the 200582 Proposal, "In basketball, football and men's ice hockey, to allow a student-athlete who
was not recruited by the original four-year institution and who has never received
institutional athletically related financial aid to be eligible for the one-time transfer
exception.").
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See, e.g., Antonya English, SEC Coaches Aren't Sold on Transfer Rule, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.sptimes.com/2O06/O8/02/Sports/
SECscoachesaren_t so.shtml (describing the general sentiment of the Southeastern
Conference that NCAA BYLAW § 14.5.5.2.3, see supra note 116, allowing graduate students
an exemption from the Transfer Rule, should be repealed); see also NCAA TRANSFER 101:
146.
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(2005-2006), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/general/transfer-guide/2005-06/200506_transfer-guide.pdf (detailing what student-athletes seeking transfer should be
considering, including familiarizing themselves with both NCAA and conference transfer
rules).
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Orleans, and other schools in the Gulf Coast region were not granted
blanket exemptions from the Transfer Rule. 14 9 Student-athletes in
these areas were forced to make a difficult choice-remain at their
current institution in an area of the country engaged in the largest
rebuilding effort the United States has ever seen, or transfer to
another institution and run the risk of sitting out one year if their
waiver was not granted. A rule regulating transfer that forces a
student-athlete to make this type of decision needs to be modified.
IV. CONCLUSION

An organization designed to regulate intercollegiate athletics
amongst the nation's colleges and universities surely serves a "public
function."' 150 The NCAA was established to embody and promote the
principles of amateurism and education, ideals which are still
embodied in the NCAA constitution today. 151 However, there is some
concern that the NCAA has drifted away from performing a public
function and towards promoting the interests of its representative
member institutions. Although these functions are legitimate, they are
unworthy of the traditional deference courts have granted the NCAA.
As Justice Barry dissented in English v. NCAA, "The NCAA virtually
controls football in over 900 colleges. Its purpose is to regulate sports
programs and maintain the integrity of amateur athletics.
Considering the NCAA's enormous control (and its laudable purposes),
it must also bear some burden to account for its heavy hand
52
options."1
Regulating the transfer of student-athletes between member
institutions certainly furthers the core goals of amateurism and
promotion of education. At some point, however, that regulation may
infringe upon the very principles it was designed to protect. An
analysis of the Transfer Rule in light of the rationales as set forth in
McHale casts serious doubt on whether the Rule, in its current state
furthers the goals it was designed to promote.1 53 Both the courts and
the NCAA should take affirmative steps to more completely align-the
Rule with its rationales.
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The courts can do this by implementing a higher standard of
review. Traditionally courts have embraced the NCAA as an
institution serving a public purpose, one that seeks to ensure the
safety of participants and the furtherance of amateurism.154 However,
if courts engage in the type of analysis used in Board of Regents,
recognizing the current practices of the NCAA, there may be grounds
for engaging in a heightened standard of review. 155 Shifting from
rational basis to a heightened standard would require the NCAA to
describe how the Transfer Rule and decisions made on appeal are
furthered by the rationales the NCAA offered in McHale.156 A
deferential standard of review makes challenging the NCAA's rules
and procedures difficult as courts are reluctant to overturn the policy
decisions of the NCAA. Unless courts mandate reform, it seems
unlikely that the NCAA will be under any pressure to modify their
existing rules.
The NCAA can also take steps to align the Transfer Rule with
the rationales provided in McHale. 5 7 First, interests would be aligned
by an expansion of the exceptions available under the Rule. Providing
more line item exceptions to the Rule, such as allowing transfers
solely for academic reasons, would add legitimacy to the Rule and
transparency to the process. Second, relaxing the rigidity of the oneyear residency requirement may help further the rationales given for
the Rule. Students transferring to similarly-situated schools with a
similar degree of academic rigor are unlikely to require an entire year
of adjustment. Without such flexibility, the stricture of the Rule looks
more like a penalty than concern for the student-athlete's wellbeing.
Adjusting the Transfer Rule to specify factors that would warrant a
reduction in the one-year adjustment period would help to ensure that
the Rule and its rationales are aligned.
As with most organizations, the NCAA has evolved over time.
It has adapted to the needs of its member institutions and the
markets related to college athletics. Courts too should adapt by
taking an active role in assuring that the public function of the NCAA
is being furthered by requiring a rational connection between the
NCAA's rules and its rationales. This heightened standard is required
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to ensure that the NCAA continues to facilitate the production of a
"public good." 158
JonathanJenkins*

Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 122.
J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, 2007. The author wishes to
thank his family for their support and the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and
Technology Law editing staff for all their time, insight and hard work.
158.

